Two contrasting styles faced each other in Seoul with a powerful Nigeria full of enthusiasm, up against the more technical and patient Spanish style; the result? An open attacking game, with plenty of chances but in the end, Spain lost in a shoot-out, which followed history, with most Spanish national teams being knocked out in the latter stages of a competition, perhaps due to an unseen mental block.

Nigeria’s adventurous style created a number of chances, with a plethora of dribbles, past a number of Spanish players, shooting as soon as the opportunity rose. Naturally, this eccentric style resulted in a number of efforts unsuccessfully off target. Spain too, missing the striker’s instinct and cutting edge provided by Barcelona’s Bojan Krkic, who was suspended, and so adopted this method of shooting on site, with the link up play with the strikers erased by the disciplined Nigerian defence, whose quick release of possession allowed the Super Eagles to embark on quick counter attacks, to unsettle the Spaniards.

Quick passing and strength allowed Yemi Tella’s side to keep the ball well and the dangerous Rafeal amongst others provided a predatory threat to De Gea’s goal, with long shots, to mazy dribbles and good positioning making him a constant threat. But don’t forget luck. When a cross evaded all and reached the far post (30’), he cut inside his marker to create space, and having done the hard part, the shot rifled the net from five yards (the side netting that is).

What followed was constant Nigerian pressure, with the Spaniards unable to cope with the speed and strength, which was clearly evident, of the African side. When Spain attempted to break up the run of play, they were unsuccessful, with Fran Merida and co. being pressed into making errors. In one occasion, Spain did nearly score (35’) but at the far post from a corner, the Spanish player side-footed against the post, in what was one of the game’s best chances.

The end to end action petered out, as the tempo slowed and both sides over-hit simple passes or tried the unnecessarily complex pass. Any attempts to break the deadlock were becoming more desperate, with the best chances coming from set pieces. In a jagged second period Spain, had few opportunities, but decision making was poor, even by the normally reliable Merida, who opted to shoot (high and wide), when a pass was better option.

Nigeria discovered a late sense of urgency and attacked in numbers with substitute Isa forced a great save from the Spanish keeper after he controlled a pass over the top of the Spanish defence, cut inside his marker and fired towards the opposite corner, with De Gea tipping the ball over at full stretch (90+2’). The game could have been over earlier if Nigeria used their counter attacks to good effect, with a number of their players guilty of perhaps overplaying and losing the opportunity to create a scoring chance.

Extra time beckoned and both sides hit the woodwork, with Iago Falque, who has interested Chelsea cutting in from the right wing, firing in a powerful drive (116’). The look on his face presumed defeat, as the penalty shoot-out loomed. Both sides received bookings as the flow broke up, and both Merida and Abdulkarim being booked for unnecessary challenges.

Ajiboye was to be Nigeria’s hero saving two spot kicks and seeing another wide, with his large presence. The final penalty was slightly delayed due the ball being in the wrong position and with the added pressure of the necessity to score; Iago Falque struck a poor penalty straight at Ajiboye and sealed the Super Eaglets’ win in Seoul.

No doubt the number of scouts would have been impressed by the talent displayed in South Korea, with eyes pointing towards, Toni Kroos, the German playmaker, Chrisantus, the top-scoring Nigerian, and naturally Bojan Krkic, who is set to break into Barcelona’s first team, while his team mate Dani Aquino has already been interesting Real Madrid. It is natural to expect that in a few years time, these same names will be showing their talents on a much greater stage.

Posted on September 9th, 2007 | 2 Comments »
Filed under: football, international, penalties, tactics

There have been football matches over various times, which have shaped the game as we know it. The result has been creation of new formations, new styles and the making and breaking of reputations within the game. What is the cause of such great change? Defeat: an enigma that occurs on many occasions, yet the cause of defeat itself lies on a number of factors rather than a solitary, crystal-clear reason. Surely it cannot be as Ronaldo suggested in a 2000 hearing, analysing the loss against France a few years previous?

On a number of occasions, the defeat is often self-inflicting, with poor tactics being exploited by the opposition team, with the manager being criticised. For example in 1950, Brazil’s reliance on the opposition playing the WM formation (devised by Herbert Chapman of Arsenal), which they easily took apart, was the predominant factor in their 2-1 defeat to Uruguay. The Uruguayans, in contrast to Spain and Sweden took up an offensive looking formation, and found faults in the Brazilians defensive line, which was covered up by their brilliant attacking play. The consequence of the defeat was so great that even now it is seen as the greatest national tragedy in Brazilian history, where the overwhelming favourites lost. According to Alex Bellos’s Futebol, in the 28th minute, Obdulio hit Bigode, Brazil’s left half, and this punch changed the psychological advantage that Brazil had over their opponents. And in the 79th minute, Gigghia caught out Barbosa, by shooting at the near post rather than crossing as he did for Uruguay’s first goal. It is now known as The Fateful Goal.

A similar national tragedy occurred in 1974, when Rinus Michels reunited the majority of the legendary Ajax team for the World Cup. Similar to 1950, the fate of the final had already been sealed according to the public and the media. Jules Rimet had already prepared a speech in Portuguese; The Brazilian Federation had ordered gold medals for the players and for the 173,850 Brazilians, losing to local rivals, recently disposed of, in front ‘almost 10%’ of Rio’s population’, a world record at the time, according to Bellos. Countless books and articles have been published since then, analysing why such an impossible result had indeed happened. Overwhelming favourites in Germany 1974, against the hosts themselves, this defeat is blamed on a plethora of reasons, but most intriguingly against Bild, the German tabloid, who ran a story of a pool party before the final itself. The party may have caused a change in mood in the Dutch camp, with the wives and girlfriends calling to seek the truth. In the years after the defeat, they acknowledge its existence, but deny their partners’ involvement in it.

Another reason is political. The Nazi invasion of Holland in the World War is one that is almost always mentioned in the build up to any Dutch-German match up, and many see this as an inferiority complex in Holland’s disfavour. Yet when the Dutch found themselves a goal up inside a minute from Cruyff’s run and the penalty which it fashioned, they ‘forgot’ about the second goal and killing the game off. They wanted to embarrass their ‘German oppressors’, which their fellow finalists had no part in. This taunting football, angered the Germans, led by Beckenbauer, Der Kaiser, and soon they rallied, with Paul Breitner and Der Bomber, Gerd Muller scoring an awkward yet balletic goal. As the second half progressed, the Dutch played their usual game of ‘Total Football’, but could not breach the Deutsch rearguard, led by the original libero Beckenbauer.

What other reasons can one conjure up, rather than inferior quality? The fact that Cruyff, man-marked by Berti Vogts, played too deep in the first half to have impact through his sublime technical ability, shows that even a tactical genius such as the Dutchman himself is prone to flaws. Another reason, why defeat occurs is through refereeing decisions. The words by Beckenbauer to English referee Jack Taylor in the appeals to the first minute Dutch penalty award may have affected his unbiased view throughout the rest of the game. ‘You are an Englishman’ must have echoed through his mind when awarding a penalty to the Germans, for which Holzenbein dived. This was countered when he disallowed a potential second Muller goal for offside, perhaps in his mind evening up the consequences of his previous decision.

Rene Mercet is a name which lies with Italy’s 1934 World Cup success. The Swiss referee had a hand in Italy’s path to World Cup glory. With the use of this global sporting event hosted in Italy, Mussolini used it to his advantage to promote his fascist views. Mercet is thought to have favoured Italy through controversial refereeing decisions, seen in Italy’s 7-1 win against the USA and the Quarter Final replay against Spain. He was later suspended by the Swiss Football Federation. Calls for use of goal-line technology were heightened when teams were saved from defeat due to a lack of communication. The first incident was in early 2005, when Pedro Mendes’s shot from 50 yards was fumbled by then United keeper Roy Carroll, but the linesman Rob Lewis defends the ‘non-goal’ claiming he was ‘doing my primary job’ which was ‘watching for offside’. Worse was the ‘lack of concentration’ in a regional tournament in the state of Sao Paulo, where female referee Silvia Regina de Oliveira awarded a goal when a ball boy kicked the ball in jest into the net, allowing Santacruzense to draw level late into the game. As was the case with Cruyff’s decision not to go to the 1978 World Cup, the decision was blamed on his wife Danny; it seemed easy to blame defeat on women then.

Unlike Mussolini, who was promoting his Fascist party, Franco, the notorious Spanish dictator, used to apparently allow Barcelona the occasional victory in the El Clasico derby in order exploit morbo, and in this way he portrayed the Catalan club and everything connected with it to be taboo. He banned Catalan to be spoken amongst other things. In 1943, Barcelona were 3-0 up front the first leg in the King’s cup match, and lost 11-1 in the second leg after a visit before the game from the director of state security threatening the players that they are only living in the country due to the generous nature of Franco. This bullying nature still appears to live on in Madrid through their tactics in the transfer market.

The final reason is financial. Of course aside from the watch worth £18,000, that Moggi gave to a referee in Italy, in return for certain favours within the recipient’s profession, there lies a reason why defeat occurs instead of corruption and match-fixing. Conspiracy theorists will be glad to see the return of contemplating the reason of Ronaldo’s zombie-esque movement in the 1998 World Cup final. Many say it was a fit of some sort, but what was the reason for the inclusion in the starting XI? Perhaps a boot contract that requires him to play? This was also reported to be the case why Rensenbrink of the Netherlands played in the 1974 final, when it was clear he was not fit with a thigh injury.

Or maybe you could forget all this and just believe Ronaldo’s input, which is to put it simply: difference in quality, conceding goals and also poor team performance.

Posted on September 1st, 2007 | No Comments »
Filed under: football, international, tactics

Granted it was his first big game for the club, but on first impressions, class usually shines through and here it was a dark cloud that hung over the Bernabeu more so than anything else. When bombing forward with the ball, Pepe first seemed to be a reminder of Bayern’s Lucio, but when he stayed forward, leaving Cannavaro to defend against a dangerous and effective Sevilla attack, it clearly showed that he lacks the discipline to play in a top team.

The Real movement was very poor, which presented a lack of options to play the ball out of the defence, but when options were open he passed the ball either out of play or straight to the defence, with Sneijder, supposed to be providing an link throughout the team, virtually anonymous. The game passed Diarra by, a player more suited to perhaps a physical battle, not a common occurrence in Spain. The Midfield was too narrow, with Robinho, Drenthe, although he scored playing in each other’s space, allowing the Andalusian club to exploit the space with ease. A Kanoute hat-trick and Renato double sealed a convincing win over their title rivals.

The width came from the full backs, with Ramos capping an effective attacking performance with a goal, and this left Cannavaro playing against three men, with Drenthe always overlapping Robinho (in the second half, when he was moved back), and Ramos, practically the only effective outlet for the Madrid giants, and when that is the case, it is clear that the final outcome is not going to be great. While Alves was a force, with driving runs, the discipline of Poulsen and Renato covered their team-mate’s (a word not heard by the 11 footballers in the white shirts) place.

Eventually, his generally poor performance was worsened by a hand ball to clear the ball over the bar to concede a penalty and then a sending off. When Queiroz said he could have bought Pepe a number of years ago for €2 million, perhaps that value hasn’t risen, except through Calderon’s overindulgence in signing playing staff. Schuster has a huge job in overturning his side’s fortunes, and sorting the mental block of his players in not passing to one another quickly enough, after deciding that dribbling or a shot on goal is not possible. Schuster must build from the back in order to keep the vultures off his back. The return of his fellow countryman Metzelder will be crucial. However the link through the team, still hangs on Guti’s shoulders, who is a bit-part player, yet still turns the team’s game around in his substitute appearances. Sneijder will step into this role but the squad must remain the same for a team approach and spirit to be created.

Another sacking is imminent and a lack of continuity in Real’s play is evident, and with Calderon adopting this strategy of sack and hope, it appears that the Madrid club will not have a team (just 11 individuals) ready in time for the Madrid derby and first game of La Liga season.

Posted on August 20th, 2007 | 1 Comment »
Filed under: Real Madrid, defender, football, tactics

You may think I’m crazy, but I’m not actually comparing this Arsenal side to that great Ajax team, more towards the entire Dutch culture towards football and it appears to relate to this new Arsenal side.

Naturally it is easy to look at past Dutch players at the club, when you had arguably the most influential player of his era in Dennis Bergkamp. He often said, ‘I guess I’m not interested in scoring ugly goals’, and this is clear to see nowadays with a number of flair players at the club, preferring to pass the ball to create an opening and scoring a ‘pure’ goal. It is this moral superiority of aesthetically better football, which causes defeats against inferior opposition. The Dutch have had a nemesis in the shape of the dreaded penalty shoot-out, and it is interesting to note that in 1998 World Cup Semi-final penalty shoot-out defeat against an inferior Brazil only Overmars and Bergkamp scored their respective spot-kicks, perhaps showing a different, perhaps English perspective towards this lottery. It is because of this moral high ground that perhaps the team have subconsciously not tried as much against teams in the lower half of the table, an argument clearly proven in the results against those very teams.

Moving on to the coach, Wenger is similar to the Romanian Stefan Kovacs, in his footballing philosophy. Both allowed their players freedom, in their style of play and used a closer man-management approach rather than the disciplinarians whom they succeeded in George Graham and Rinus Michels (excluding Bruce Rioch). It was in Kovacs’s years as coach, in which Ajax swept all aside in front of them, with a freedom to play and destroy. Both emphasised a team ethos and perhaps it is because the lack of a true leader that Arsenal failed. The most technically gifted players were the captains in Henry and Cruyff, and while one was tactically accomplished, and a leader, the other had a glaring, demotivating stare. While both left their respective teams, Cruyff, because he was voted out of the captaincy, and Henry, for personal reasons, they were both repressing the rest of their team-mates. It was rumoured that a number of the other Ajax players were disconcerted by Cruyff’s influence at the club, while the youngsters were intimidated by Henry’s glare and the enormity of his accomplishments.

While this Gunners team is nowhere near in the league of that great Ajax team, it can accomplish success through a style of football based on Michel’s idea, but with football now faster and more physical it would be impossible to create such a team. Ajax, like Arsenal in recent years did defeat big teams, such as Shankly’s Liverpool but could not bring home trophies due to a lack of experience, in similar fashion to Arsenal’s near misses in the Champions League and Carling Cup. Yet they eventually achieved greatness as Wenger can do so with this young, underrated team. Wenger even appears to be attempting to build such a side, with versatile players such as Hleb, Flamini and Sagna all a part of the Arsenal line up. He has even recently encouraged his defenders to burst forward, such as Toure’s run leading to a powerful penalty in the match against Fulham, and also Gallas’s forays forward against Ajax in preseason.

Naturally you wouldn’t expect to see van Persie as the furthest player back, as some sort of shape and discipline must be required to play in English football today. This comes through the reliable Gilberto and Fabregas axis, with allows the full backs to burst forward and overlap as they did effectively against Sparta in the Champions league qualifier recently. Arsenal’s tempo currently is too low to play such a brand of possession football as the extra few seconds allows the opposition to reshape their defence. Therefore there must be an option back in an attempt to retain the ball, this is why Gilberto must be open and cover any defensive position. It is this sort of decision making commonly seen in van Gaal’s Ajax of the nineties, where simplicity was used and triangles created on the pitch as is possible in the 4-5-1/4-3-3, which the Gunners are recently adopting. It is such simplicity, which Arsenal lack, for example, if the ten outfield players where on the edge of their box, Arsenal would try and pass through, when Cruyff would say, ‘pass around the majority’. The fluid attack gives Arsenal more options and a surprise in who will have the final shot on goal, but because of this style odd play, the team must become more efficient (another Dutch trait in which there is a lack of killer instinct) and defend as a unit.

Speaking of a unit, there are many potentially brilliant players at the club, but there must not be too many individualistic players, which causes a friction in team spirit. The same can be said of Holland at international tournaments, where each player is seeking personal glory and cannot even utter a word of the national anthem. This was similar to the spirit at Colney in 2005/06, with a split of the ‘invincibles’ and the younger players. Greed and money is a common issue in football…just ask Ashley Cole, this is a Dutch characteristic which appears frequently and thankfully there appears to be no sign of such an unnecessary attribute in the Arsenal squad currently. It was obvious that having different style of player up front changes the perspective of the game, while, the rest of the team, play aesthetically superior football, which in reality appears have little end product, using an awkward figure point changes the attacking options. The Czech Republic team with Jan Koller had skilful players such as Nedved and Rosicky, but rather than a flat pass as a final ball, Koller provides aerial threat, and a physical style that mixes well with the flair players and their ‘tiki taka’, as Sid Lowe of the Guardian put it, style of play (pass and move).

In conclusion, this is why against gritty teams, which Arsenal feel superior to, should be up against a Bendtner style player, who won a number of headers against the huge (but average) Zat Knight, because Bendtner does not play that style of ‘Dutch’ football, but the more efficient ‘German’ style (if you forgive me for another stereotypical comparision). He is still young, thus his technique will improve as will his experience of top flight football. Therefore, Arsenal must strive to use a player, who will adapt to their playing style, but also bring one of his own, and that is difficult in today’s game.

Posted on August 18th, 2007 | No Comments »
Filed under: Arsenal, football, international, striker, tactics